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The USA and Asia have an enormous stake in each others’ continuing prosperity. This outcome is
linked to the preservation of the open international economic order, which in turn faces challenges
at both the interstate diplomatic level and at the domestic political level. The global ﬁnancial crisis
is probably the worst since the Great Depression and the domestic politics makes it increasingly
difﬁcult to formulate a constructive trade policy. In the absence of adequate reform at the global
level, the alternative could be further fragmentation into competing regional blocs. Asia holds
the key, combining both dissatisfaction with existing global arrangements with the resources to
reconstitute, at least at the regional level, an alternative set of institutions and practices. How Asia
responds, acting to strengthen reformed global institutions or undermine them in favor of regional
alternatives, will partly depend on the policies of the dominant global power, the USA.
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1. Introduction
That the USA and Asia have an enormous stake in their shared prosperity should go
without saying: trans-Paciﬁc economic integration is deep, and US leadership for more
than one half century has supported the maintenance of a liberal global trade and ﬁnan-
cial system, the enabling framework in which Asia has experienced its spectacular
development.
Looking forward, however, the relationship faces major challenges. In the short run,
the global ﬁnancial crisis, with its epicenter in the US, will have both a direct impact on
Asianeconomicperformancethroughtradeandﬁnancialchannels,aswellasalonger-run
impact on this event’s impact through induced policy changes in the US, regionally and
globally. These developments in turn feed into the increasingly difﬁcult long-term chal-
lenges of managing globalization and maintaining the open international economic order
which has served American and Asian interests.
Asia, with a large number of economies of widely varying sizes and income levels,
encompasses enormous diversity. One implication is that while the process of growing
regional trade and investment ties are forging a stronger regional identity than one that
existed in the past, the national interests of Asian countries diverge on many speciﬁc
policy issues, creating some paradoxical challenges for American policymakers: Asia’s
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emergence in Asia of regional institutions and initiatives requires a US policy response.
TheUSAwillhosttheAsia–PaciﬁcEconomicCooperation(APEC)forumin2011,forcing
Asian regional issues onto the agenda of the current Administration.
For the most part,the US policy agenda toward Asia does not revolve around regional
issues, however. Instead, it is largely derivative of American global economic concerns.
Likewise, from the standpoint of most Asian governments, the issues of greatest salience
in their relationship with the USA are either bilateral in nature, or are the bilateral
manifestation of issues of global concern. Some of the critical items on the US economic
agenda with Asia – establishing a viable policy on sovereign wealth funds, the Korea–US
Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), and the future of the Doha Development Round of
multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), to name three – may or may not be speciﬁcally “Asian” per se.
The ability of the USA and Asia to work together to sustain an open system of
international economic relations face challenges at both the inter-state diplomatic level
and at the domestic political level. The Obama Administration, in particular, faces two
speciﬁc challenges in organizing American economic diplomacy toward Asia. The global
ﬁnancial crisis is probably the worst since the Great Depression and the domestic political
environmentwhichmakesitincreasinglydifﬁculttoformulateaconstructivetradepolicy.
The relationship between the USA and Asia will be the single biggest determinant in
the evolution of the global economic system. Accelerated fragmentation of the global
economy is a distinct possibility. Asia is key, combining both dissatisfaction with existing
global arrangements with the resources to reconstitute, at least at the regional level, an
alternative set of institutions and practices. How Asia handles this situation, acting to
strengthen reformed global institutions or undermine them in favor of regional alterna-
tives, will partly turn on the policies of the dominant global power, the USA.
2. The Global Financial Crisis
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that global ﬁnancial output will fall by
1.3% in 2009, making it the worst year since the Great Depression (IMF 2009a). The
origins of the current ﬁnancial crisis reside primarily in developments in US ﬁnancial
markets. The development of highly complex ﬁnancial instruments, many related to the
securitization of mortgage lending, was abetted by unusually low interest rates as a result
of a variety of factors including the Asian savings glut, and a bias toward monetary ease
under the Greenspan Fed, which both facilitated borrowing in the ﬁrst instance or
primary sense,as well as encouraging excessive leverage among secondary market partici-
pants (Taylor, 2009).
The ratings agencies and regulators were asleep at the switch. In particular, the regu-
latory system of the USA was revealed to be fragmented and inadequate,particularly with
respect to the so-called “second banking system” comprised of non-bank ﬁnancial insti-
tutions such as hedge funds.Abundant liquidity and regulatory lassitude enabled criminal
frauds on a grand scale, of which the Madoff and Stanford scandals are the leading
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ticularly in the UK.
The crisis was propagated internationally through open capital markets exposing
pre-existing weaknesses in ﬁnancial sectors and participants outside the USA, and once
the crisis got underway, rising interest rates exposed weaknesses in other segments of the
US ﬁnancial market, such as consumer lending and commercial real estate in the USA.
Crisis response in the USA has been forceful (at least as measured by expenditures), but
inconsistentandadhoc,complicatedbytheelectoralcalendarintheUSAandthepolitical
transition from the Bush Administration to the Obama Administration.
Benchmarkingagainstpastbankingcrises,USeconomycouldcontinueshrinkinginto
2010, followed by slow recovery, and eventual increases in asset prices and employment,
with housing prices taking the longest time to recover (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008), though
others have predicted a more rapid recovery (Bernanke, 2009; Mussa, 2009).While trying
to calculate losses ex ante in the midst of a crisis is a mug’s game, the IMF estimates that
current gross ﬁnancial losses are $4.1 trillion,with losses on US assets $2.2 trillion or 15%
of current gross domestic product (GDP). These estimates have risen as the crisis has
unfolded (IMF, 2009b), putting them into the same league as those experienced by Japan,
Korea, and Taiwan during their crises in the 1990s. Boone and Johnson (2009) have
ventured that ultimate taxpayer costs will be on the order of $1 trillion. There is some
thought that the crisis will actually prove more severe and protracted in Europe.
Some Asian countries have beneﬁtted substantially from the rapid growth of con-
sumption in the USA since 1994, which coincided with their interests in running current
account surpluses and accumulating reserves as a form of self-insurance following the
1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis. In 2007, China’s current account surplus as a share
of GDP reached a historically unprecedented 11 percent, and is forecast to remain an
extraordinary 10% through 2009 (IMF, 2009a), and during the early stages of the current
episode,therewaswishfulthinkingabout“decoupling,”thenotionthatAsiawouldbeable
to maintain its growth rates, even as the USA and Europe slowed.
Rather than “decoupling,” Asia appears to be experiencing “re-coupling” or “reverse
coupling”with a vengeance. There are multiple channels through which this is occurring.
Themostobviousisthroughthe“real”channel,asacombinationof slowdownintheUSA
and Europe and depreciation of the US dollar leads to a substantial, sustained increase in
US net exports. This adjustment is already beginning to occur, and is happening much
moreabruptlythangenerallyanticipated.Oneupsideformostof Asiaassociatedwiththis
weakening of global growth has been the fall in commodity prices, the price of oil in
particular, and the improvement in terms of trade has acted as a kind of automatic
stabilizer, cushioning the external shock. But it is unlikely that the USA will be able to
continue as the “consumer of last resort” and the IMF predicts that the region will not
experience a sustained recovery until mid-2010 and that it cannot rely on China to pull it
out of its slump (Burton, 2009). To revive growth, Asian countries will have to increase
domestic demand in the context of an unwinding of the massive global imbalances.
Beyond the real effects, Asian economies will suffer losses based on their degree of
exposure to troubled markets. Shocks felt through this ﬁnancial channel may have
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in exchange rate adjustments, including an appreciation of the Japanese yen, associated with
a reversal of the carry-trade. Over the course of 2008, the Korean won depreciated more
than 40% against the Japanese yen, for example. This shift in competitiveness could have
additionalknock-onimplications;itisconceivablethatKoreanautoﬁrmscouldexperience
an increase in market share at the expense of Japanese assemblers in the shrinking US
market,complicating the passage of the KORUS free trade agreement (FTA),for example.
A key issue is how China will contribute to greater stability in international economic
relations. Chinese ofﬁcials have become more assertive in their pronouncements on
international economic issues, criticizing US economic policies, and calling for a new
reserve currency based on the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).Whatever the reserve
currency, an outstanding issue is whether and how China will increase the ﬂexibility of
exchange rate determination and how this might affect the movements of other Asian
currencies against the yuan. The bilateral trade imbalance between the USA and China
ballooned to $266 billion in 2008, accounting for one-third of USA’s global trade deﬁcit
of nearly $800 billion. In the long run, China will experience signiﬁcant real appreciation
generated by its rising productivity in its traded goods sector,the current account surplus
willdiminish,andexchangeratepolicywillmovetowardamoregenuineﬂoat.Butgetting
to this outcome will be politically contentious, and the Obama Administration will face
Congressional pressure on the Chinese currency issue.
The crisis is likely to prove to be a watershed event and have a longer-term effect on
Asia through what might be called the policy channel. In response to the crisis, the USA
is currently re-regulating its ﬁnancial sector on an ad hoc basis,reversing the trend toward
ﬁnancial market deregulation begun during the Carter Administration in the 1970s. At
some point, US authorities will attempt to move beyond improvisation and undertake a
concerted regulatory overhaul.A key issue is whether such interventions would adversely
affect US economic performance,possibly contributing to a decline in the relative impor-
tance of the USA in the global economy and reducing American diplomatic relevance. If
inexpertly done, this move could both impair the competitiveness of the US economy as
well as reduce the attractiveness of the US ﬁnancial sector. Both developments would be
bad for Asia.
Enhanced regulation would also change the ideological context of international policy
formation both bilaterally and through multilateral institutions for ﬁnancial sector liber-
alization generally, and external liberalization speciﬁcally. Less pressure for ﬁnancial
market liberalization on Asian countries would emanate from multilateral organizations
such as the IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank (ADB). With a lag, this shift
would presumably be reﬂected in the US trade negotiation agenda:with less conﬁdence in
unfetteredﬁnancialmarketoperation,andUSpolicyswingingbacktowardregulation,US
demands for Asian countries to liberalize their ﬁnancial markets and grant US service
providersgreateraccesswouldeventuallyattenuateorbecomelesseffective.Thistendency
is already manifest in the April 2009 G-20 Leaders Statement which made“strengthening
ﬁnancial supervision and regulation”a key component of their recovery and reform plan
(Leaders of the Group of Twenty, 2009).
American Economic Relations with Asia Marcus Noland
© 2009 The Author
Journal Compilation © 2009 Japan Center for Economic Research 184Heightened interest in the regulation of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) will be of
immediate relevance to Asian sovereign investors. The IMF is facilitating a dialog on
identifying best practices for SWFs; the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development is running a counterpart operation for SWF investment recipient countries.
In March 2008, the USA, United Arab Emirates, and Singapore, homes of some of the
oldest SWFs,announced a code of conduct,which they hope will gain adherents and form
the basis for a global standard. The IMF’s International Working Group (which includes
Australia,China,Korea,NewZealand,Singapore,andtheUSAamongitsmembers)issued
a set of voluntary principles in October 2008.
3. Longer-term Challenges
Globalization is built on the twin supports of technological innovations and supportive
institutions that facilitate the global diffusion of those technological innovations. Follow-
ing two world wars and the Great Depression, which brought an earlier “Golden Age” of
globalization to a close, the noncommunist world, led by the USA, began to reassemble
the pieces of a liberal trading order: a key currency system based on the US dollar and
supportivemultilateralinstitutions,includingtheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade
(GATT) and its eventual successor, the WTO, as well as other multilateral institutions,
such as the World Bank and the IMF in the ﬁnancial sphere. This order’s sustainability is
in doubt, however.
Globalization creates winners and losers, begetting social tensions that must be
managed at both the national and international levels. At the national level, for example,
in the USA, the public is split largely along educational lines – those with only a high
school education or less fear globalization, while those with some post–high school
educationtendtoviewitbenignly(Blonigen,2008).Whileitispossiblethatthisdifference
in outlook is a result of the ignorance of less-educated people, their assessment may also
reﬂect a rational appraisal of the impact of globalization on their earnings and relative
status. In the USA, it appears that married females, who for social reasons have less
geographical mobility,experience particularly large lifetime earning losses associated with
trade-related job displacement (Kletzer, 2001). Similar political tendencies are evident in
Asia. In Asia, polling conducted between November 2008 and February 2009 suggests
a growing dissatisfaction with the status quo, both with respect to international and
national economic systems (BBC Poll, 2009).
1
Hence, the status quo faces at least two sources of potential vulnerability. The ﬁrst
challenge is at the diplomatic level. Globalization thrives on order. The issue today is that
the objections to globalization on current terms by a growing number of systemically
important participants may degrade the existing commercial regime signiﬁcantly without
constituting a consensus sufﬁcient either to reform the existing system or construct a
coherent alternative.
In this respect Asia is key; in the decade since the 1997–1998 crisis,Asian disappoint-
ment with “Washington” – both the US government and the Washington-based World
BankandIMF–hasencouragedapushforbothgreaterinﬂuencewithintheseinstitutions
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Asians regard the Fund’s performance during this episode as incompetent, if not mali-
cious. In the aftermath of the crisis, the Asians in effect said “never again,” building up
colossal foreign exchange reserves as a form of self-insurance while exploring reinvigo-
rated Asian regional ﬁnancial initiatives. What sets Asia apart from other regions of the
worldsuchasLatinAmericaorAfricawheregovernmentsmayhavesimilardissatisfaction
with the existing order, is that with roughly $4 trillion in ofﬁcial reserves, Asia has the
ﬁnancial resources to alter, reinforce, or undermine the existing order if the political will
is there.
The second vulnerability is that systemically important governments will be unable to
sustain an internal political consensus supportive of an open system. Of course these two
challenges are interrelated – changes to rules may be politically controversial and accept-
able in one polity but not another,so the sustainability of globalization at its current level
will reﬂect both the interplay of interstate diplomacy and domestic politics. Management
of these challenges is likely to be made more acute by the global ﬁnancial crisis and the
political stresses entailed, at least in the short run. Trade volumes declined in the second
half of 2008,andtheWorldBankispredictingthattradewillshrinkin2009,fallingforthe
ﬁrsttimesince1982,andexhibitingitsweakestperformancesincetheBankbegankeeping
records in 1970 (World Bank, 2009).
4. Inter-state Issues: Complexity, Pluralism, and Legitimacy
Over the past 30 years,the USA has undergone a remarkable process of globalization.The
share of merchandise trade in national income has nearly doubled to 23%, making the
USA a more open economy than other large industrial countries such as Japan or
Germany (excluding intra-EU transactions). The USA faces issues of how to prioritize its
own efforts among multilateral, regional, and bilateral initiatives, and how to evaluate its
interests vis-à-vis Asian regional initiatives.
4.1 Trade
The WTO is the centerpiece of US trade policy. All major Asian countries are members.
The Doha Development Round,the organization’s ongoing negotiations,has stalled for a
variety of reasons:a complex negotiating agenda;the increasing assertiveness of a number
of participants, notably China and India; political weakness in the traditional major
powerswhichhasmadecompromise,particularlyonthecentralissueof agriculture,more
difﬁcult.Onagriculture,Asiahasnocoherentregionalinterest.SomeAsiancountriessuch
as Japan and South Korea number among the world’s most inefﬁcient and protected
agricultural producers, while Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the
Philippines, and Thailand are members of the Cairns Group of self-identiﬁed, nonsubsi-
dizing agricultural exporters. Two developments over the last quarter century greatly
complicated the negotiation process.
The ﬁrst is that the successful conclusion of trade negotiations has been made more
difﬁcult as the substantive agenda has broadened and grown more complex. Changes
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production and sales operations, the shift in the developed countries toward a
“post-industrial economy,” and the growth of tradable services, all contributed to a
shift away from the old tariff-cutting paradigm of trade negotiations. As difﬁcult
as agreeing on tariff-cutting formulas may have seemed to the negotiators of the
Kennedy or Tokyo Rounds, the conceptual complexity and political sensitivity of these
efforts paled beside the emerging “behind the border” issues such as competition
policy and intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, to say nothing of the hot-
button “social agenda” of labor and environmental standards. The climate change–trade
linkage is likely to rise in importance in coming years, further increasing political
salience and complexity. The length of time needed to complete a round has steadily
lengthened, with the Uruguay Round, which greatly broadened disciplines on services
protection, introduced IPR obligations into the system, and established the WTO and its
strengthened dispute settlement system, taking from 1986 to 1994 to conclude. Its suc-
cessor, the Doha Development Round, launched in 2001, remains in suspended
animation. (Ironically, the speciﬁc trigger for the most recent collapse of negotiations
was a dispute over the very traditional issue of agricultural tariffs.) There are already
calls to shift the negotiating agenda toward more uncharted territory or to deemphasize
multilateral negotiations through the WTO (Crook, 2008; Mattoo & Subramanian,
2009).
At the same time that the trade agenda was expanding and impinging more on what
had been purely domestic policy concerns, the set of diplomatically relevant negotiating
parties was expanding. The GATT had effectively been a US–European Union (EU)
condominium. Ironically the very successes of the Uruguay Round – the extended obli-
gations, single undertaking, and strengthened dispute settlement – contained the seeds of
the old paradigm’s destruction. In the past, practices such as “special and differential”
treatment,whicheffectivelyabsolveddevelopingcountriesfrommostobligations,andthe
use of opt-in“codes”on issues such as government procurement,which allowed countries
to take on differing levels of obligations, created automatic political safety valves for
developing-country participants. The Uruguay Round’s single undertaking at once
enhanced the obligations embodied in the system and their enforceability. At the same
time, the technical and ﬁnancial aid promised to developing countries to support taking
on these heightened obligations was largely not forthcoming.
This experience left many developing-country governments embittered and skeptical
of entering into new obligations through the WTO system. By the time of the Doha
Development Round, launched in 2001, India, China, and other “new” players were
demanding far greater inﬂuence on the negotiations than they had been accorded in the
past and bringing with them distinct viewpoints on the role of international trade and
the appropriate rules and procedures for its governance. Thus, increasing complexity
and political sensitivity coincided with growing pluralism, presenting an obvious, and
possibly insurmountable, challenge for policy management. After the July 2008 WTO
ministerial bust-up in Geneva, whether the comatose negotiation can be revived is an
open question.
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The international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs) face interrelated challenges involving
resources and governance. At the IMF, governance more closely reﬂects the political
realities of the mid-20th century than of the 21st. Board representation is a function of
quota allocations, in principle reﬂecting the importance of individual countries in the
world economy, which sets the amount of foreign exchange countries make available for
Fund use and notionally determine the level of borrowing for which a country is eligible.
The USA,with a quota share of 17%,is the only member that can exercise sole veto power
over Executive Board decisions under the 85% qualiﬁed-majority voting system.Over the
past several years, the IMF Board has authorized two quota reallocations, which have
increased the inﬂuence of countries such as China, Mexico, Turkey, and South Korea.
Yet Asia remains underweighted. (China’s quota is less than that of France or the
Benelux countries.) The trouble is that there is a zero-sum element to Board represen-
tation, and the two overweighted regions, Western Europe and Africa, are reluctant to
see a diminution of their representation. Europe is key: African quotas are really too
small to matter in terms of rebalancing, and in light of the inﬂuence that the Bretton
Woods institutions wield in Africa, many would regard any reduction in Africa’s modest
inﬂuence within these institutions as fundamentally unfair and illegitimate, in any
event. The USA, with a quota share of 17%, has allowed its own quota to decline
(though not enough to imperil its sole veto power over Executive Board decisions under
the 85% qualiﬁed majority voting system). To satisfy Asian desires, it might be possible
to combine Western Europe into a single EU, or Eurozone, quota and reallocate to Asia
and other under-represented areas the remaining quota freed by the aggregation of
Europe into a single voting entity. Yet to accomplish this, Western European govern-
ments would have to be willing to sacriﬁce national prerogatives, and the USA might
have to surrender its veto monopoly. Thus far, European intransigence has freed the
USA from the necessity of confronting this challenge though inﬂuential voices within
Europe recognize the inevitability of change (De Larosière et al., 2009). As for Asia, there
is no single dominant economy equivalent to the USA, nor the degree of formal regional
integration like the EU or Eurozone, which could make accumulation into a single
regional voice possible.
2
The growing importance of countries beyond the small group of traditional powers
was evident in the November 2008 meeting of the G-20 hosted by the US government in
response to the global ﬁnancial crisis. While the meeting accomplished little, it at least
signaled the recognition that the“steering committee”for the world economy would have
to be broadened beyond the G-7, including such Asia–Paciﬁc countries as Australia,
China, India, Indonesia, and Korea which are not G-7 members. The organization has
formed four working groups: domestic ﬁnancial regulation, international cooperation
overseeing ﬁnancial markets, the IMF, and the multilateral development banks. The
Financial Stability Forum (upgraded at the April G-20 meeting to the Financial Stability
Board) has been broadened to include China, India, Korea, and Indonesia. Likewise, the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was recently expanded to include Australia,
Japan, Korea, China, and India.
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issue; given the magnitude of challenges confronting the global economy, the IFIs appear
to be under-resourced (Truman, 2009). At the April 2009 G-20 Leaders meeting, among
other commitments, the group pledged to treble resources available to the IMF to $750
billion,to support a new SDR allocation of $250 billion,to support at least $100 billion of
additional lending by the Multilateral Development Bank (MDBs), and to ensure $250
billion of support for trade ﬁnance. Individual countries made individual commitments,
following the leadership of Japan which had stepped forward in February 2009,signing an
agreement with the Fund to offer up to $100 billion in borrowing rights to temporarily
supplement the Fund’s resources. Goldstein (2009) recommends a “grand bargain”
between industrial and emerging market economies which would trade enhanced insur-
ance (obviating the need to run undervalued exchange rates to build reserves for self-
insurance) for greater exchange rate surveillance.
Giventhishistory,overthepastdecade,theAsianshavefocusedonregionalinitiatives,
though there is thought in some quarters,at least,that at the present juncture the regional
initiatives may be distracting from more urgent tasks at the global level (Drysdale, 2009;
Soesastro, 2009). In the ﬁnancial sphere the most prominent of these regional efforts has
been the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), a three-part cooperation framework instituting
a network of bilateral medium-term foreign exchange credit arrangements among the
central banks, undertaking regional macroeconomic surveillance, and committing to
technical assistance, with the Japanese-led ADB effectively serving as the secretariat. In
May 2009, ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers agreed to multilateralize the existing network of
bilateral swap agreements and expand commitments to the level of $120 billion, with the
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and non-ASEAN shares set at 20%
and 80% respectively, and Japan and China (inclusive of Hong Kong) each committing
$38.4billion.Originally,fulluseof CMIfundshadbeenconditionedontheborrowersuc-
cessfully concluding an agreement with the IMF, but the May 2009 ﬁnance ministers’
announcement did not mention any such linkage. The ﬁnance ministers also endorsed
the existing Asian Bonds Market Initiative and the establishment of a regional Credit
Guarantee and Investment Mechanism.
The concern of some outside observers is that the CMI were to lend under loose or
absent conditionality, the large pool of public money could fuel moral hazard and even-
tually contribute to the collapse of the globally oriented IMF. Indeed, under current
arrangements,theﬁnancesomeAsiancountriescouldaccessthroughtheCMImechanism
nowexceedstheirIMFquota.YetwiththeFunditselfeffectivelyabandoningconditionality
with its short-term liquidity facility and new ﬂexible credit line,it is likely that this linkage
to the IMF in the use of CMI funds will be eventually abandoned altogether as intimated
intheﬁnanceministers’May2009statement.Asiancountriespossessroughly$4trillionin
ofﬁcial reserves,more than 50% of the world total.If the political will is there,Asia has the
ﬁnancial wherewithal to go its own way. The May 2009 announcement, specifying China
andJapanequalsharesintheCMIMultilaterizationrepresentsastepforward.In1998,the
USA opposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund. In 2009, it has taken a hands-off
stance and frankly is not in much of a position to do otherwise.
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The difﬁculties of managing globalization at the international level are mirrored at the
level of national politics, where there is evidence of waning support for globalization at
boththemassandelitelevels.Inthelate1990s,high-levelmultilateraleconomicconclaves
such as the annual G-7 heads of government meetings,the joint World Bank–IMF annual
meetings, and WTO ministerials were usually accompanied by mass protests.
Public opinion survey data suggest that support for free markets is relatively ubiqui-
tous, though there is some variation by region in the degree of enthusiasm for markets.
Table 1 reports cross-national data on attitudes toward free markets, international eco-
nomic organizations such as the WTO and the IFIs, and globalization taken from two
surveysconductedbythePewGlobalAttitudesProject(2003,2008).Intheﬁrstsurvey,the
USA and East Asia (with the exception of Japan) are relatively supportive of markets,
South Asia less so. Support declines, however, when respondents are asked about global-
ization or speciﬁc manifestations of globalization such as the multilateral economic
organizations discussed in the preceding section. Support for globalization declines even
further when one moves from economics to cultural issues. In short, the survey shows
general comfort with markets, less comfort with international exchange, and discomfort
with the social and cultural impact of globalization. Only the “market” and “not protect
against foreign inﬂuences” questions were asked in the follow-up survey and while
support declines across the board, the USA and East Asia exhibit relatively positive
attitudes.If the lesson to be learned from the lack of Japanese support and the subsequent
across-the-board fall in support for globalization is that poor economic performance
makes people less tolerant and secure, then the current crisis does not auger well for the
future.
The decline in support in the USA for globalization is conﬁrmed by more speciﬁc
polling data on trade agreements.The intrusion of international competition into a wider
rangeof activities,andthroughtheprocessof offshoringtheintroductionof international
competition into previously sheltered, computer-savvy, middle class occupations in what
were historically considered “non-tradable” activities, has raised the political salience of
trade issues in the USA. A 2008 poll by the Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press concluded that“Americans express increasingly negative opinions toward theWorld
TradeOrganization(WTO)andfreetradeagreements(FTAs)suchastheNorthAmerican
Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA).In the current survey,a 48% plurality says that free trade
agreements are a bad thing for the country, compared with 35% of the public who call
them a good thing. Last November [i.e. 2007], opinion about free trade’s impact on the
country was evenly split; for the previous decade, modest pluralities said that free trade
agreements were good for the country . . . There is now a broad agreement that free trade
negatively affects wages,jobs,and economic growth inAmerica”(Pew Research Center for
the People and the Press, 2008; section 4). The “Buy American” proposals considered as
part of the stimulus package have broad bipartisan support: “Two thirds of Americans
think such a requirement is a good idea because it keeps jobs in America, while just 24%
see it as a bad idea because other countries might retaliate by not buying American
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Journal Compilation © 2009 Japan Center for Economic Research 191products and services. Wide majorities of Democrats (70%), Republicans (66%) and
independents (63%) all agree that it would be a good idea for the plan to require that
spendingbelimitedtoU.S.-madegoodsandservices”(PewResearchCenterforthePeople
and the Press, 2009; p. 2).
The Pew Center results of deteriorating popular support for trade are generally rein-
forced by the limited amount of time-series polling on the topic (Figure 1).
3 It is possible
that this decline in support for trade represents a temporary dip rather than a permanent
shift in attitudes; there is some evidence to suggest similar trade skepticism during the
1992 recession, which was followed by the congressional passage of NAFTA and the
Uruguay Round agreement.
Given this popular skepticism, it is not surprising that political decision-makers have
evinced trepidation. Trade policy has become increasingly partisan in the USA (see
Destler, 2005; Layman et al., 2006; Kupchan & Trubowitz, 2007), and while trade con-
cerns were probably a minor contributor, the Democratic Party, the more trade-skeptical
of the two major US political parties, won the White House in the 2008 elections with
the election of Senator Barack Obama as president and increased its majority in both
houses of the US Congress as well (Im & Sung, 2008; Pew Research Center for the People
and the Press, 2008).
4 The 2008 Democratic Party statement on trade reafﬁrms the
party’s commitment to achieving a successful completion of the Doha Round and
strengthening the rules-based multilateral system. But the document says very little
about liberalization per se; instead, its focus is on emphasizing enforcement of foreign
government obligations of existing agreements, including provisions on labor, environ-
ment, and safety standards in trade agreements, and combating currency manipulation.
It says nothing about either FTAs that have been signed but await congressional ratiﬁ-
cation (Colombia, Korea, and Panama) or other potential regional initiatives with Asia
and Latin America.
Figure 1 Opinions on impact of free trade agreements on the country.
Source: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2008).
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regard.Although the Administration appears to be backing away from some problematic
positions (such as the pledge to renegotiate NAFTA), its relatively supine response to
backdoor protection via “Buy American” initiatives, and the lack of any positive agenda
with respect to the FTAs pending ratiﬁcation are troubling. One bright spot has been
the signal that the USA is prepared to sign the ASEAN-sponsored Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation.
Operationally, the near-term prospects for US trade liberalization at either the global
or regional level have been dimmed by the expiration of “fast-track” negotiating
authority. The “fast-track” procedure precommits the Congress to a simple up/down
vote on implementing legislation – without amendment and within a speciﬁed time
frame. Given increasingly fractious US trade politics, it is highly unlikely that – in the
absence of such expedited procedures – trade accords with major partners could be
successfully concluded and enacted. Nonetheless, if the Obama Administration wants to
have a signiﬁcant proactive trade policy, it will need to persuade the Congress to renew
fast-track authority at least for the WTO negotiations, so that it can attempt to salvage
the Doha Round. It will not be easy. US credibility has dealt a potentially fatal blow
in April 2008 by the congressional decision to alter the fast-track rules ex post in the
case of the US–Colombia FTA (Bergsten, 2008). Some in Congress argue that the
Colombian case is unique and should not set a precedent for other fast-track cases,
including pending consideration of the KORUS FTA. However, what matters in this
context is not attitudes on Capitol Hill, but rather whether foreign governments will
hold back in trade negotiations with the USA for fear that the negotiated deal will be
reopened before a congressional ratiﬁcation vote. In other words, US trading partners
will be the ultimate arbiters of how badly the Congress has damaged US negotiating
credibility.
6. Prognosis: Fragmentation?
At the November 2008 and April 2009 G-20 meetings on November 15, 2008 and April 2,
2009 (as well as at the November 2008 APEC forum summit), participants committed to
a loose standstill, abjuring the introduction of new protections or derogations from
existing liberalization commitments. A number of countries appear to be honoring the
commitmentinthebreach,however:Director-Generalof theWTOreportedthatsincethe
start of 2009,there has been“signiﬁcant slippage”including the introduction of new tariff
and nontariff barriers,as well as increased use of trade-remedy actions (Lamy,2009; p.1).
An analysis by the World Bank came to similarly worrying conclusions (Gamberoni &
Newfarmer, 2009). The fact that “eyes are watching” may inhibit the willingness for
governments to reach for protectionist solutions; Elek (2009) reviews some“naming and
shaming” options.
Apart from the resort to protection in the face of shrinking aggregate demand à la the
1930s, the longer-run issue is whether the WTO system has simply become too unwieldy
to deliver much in terms of liberalization. The weaknesses of both the multilateral trade
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in both the trade and ﬁnancial ﬁelds. Accelerated fragmentation is a distinctly possible
outcome.
Stasis at the WTO has encouraged preferential trade initiatives. APEC is the most
prominent such scheme in Asia. Its membership established the goal of free trade in the
region by 2020, with the developed countries of the group completely freeing their trade
by 2010,but this commitment has foundered for a variety of reasons,including the lack of
any enforcement mechanism. As a consequence, APEC has devolved more into a consul-
tative organization to encourage trade and investment facilitation,and an opportunity for
annual heads of government meetings.
As trade liberalization has stalled at the global and regional levels,action has naturally
shifted toward more limited subregional and bilateral initiatives. The USA successfully
concluded an FTA with Singapore, but negotiations with several other Asian countries
including Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand have derailed. The USA, as a postindustrial
economy, strongly emphasizes trans-border issues such as investment and services, which
are more difﬁcult to negotiate than more traditional bilateral measures such as tariffs,
which are the focus of intra-Asian deals.The US penchant for loading labor standards and
environmental concerns into these agreements creates a situation in which negotiating an
FTA with the USA is more challenging than with other potential partners, particularly
China.
It is unclear whether KORUS will ever be ratiﬁed. The US Congress has never failed
to ratify a bilateral trade pact and failure to implement KORUS would be a terrible blow
to US–Korea relations, US standing in Asia, and the US role in global trade policy. But
despite President Obama’s reassuring words to President Lee at the April 2009 G-20
meeting, confronting this situation is not at the top of the Obama Administration’s
agenda.
Preferential trade pacts among Asian countries have proliferated. ASEAN has posi-
tioned its ownASEAN FTA as the center of a hub-and-spoke system of Asian regionalism,
creatinganetworkof broadlycomparable“10+1”agreements.Fromthestandpointof the
USA, it faces growing numbers of potentially trade-diverting pacts in its fastest-growing
export markets.
Researchers are just beginning to get a handle on how comprehensive are their pro-
visions and how widely these preferences are actually used by ﬁrms engaged in cross-
border trade and investment (Kawai & Wignaraja, 2009). One simulation model found
that the USA could lose as much as $25 billion of annual exports solely from the
static discriminatory effects of an East Asian Free Trade Area (Scollay & Gilbert, 2001)
while other, dynamic, models concluded that real welfare loss would be lower (Jiang &
McKibbin 2008; Lee et al., 2009).
Itisimportanttoembedregionaleconomicinitiativesinbroadergeographiccontexts,
lest they subsequently turn inward and become closed blocs (Petri [2008] provides a more
optimistic interpretation, albeit one which ignores the practical difﬁculties of knitting
together multiple, inconsistent arrangements). In this regard, a survey of 262 Asian“stra-
tegicelites”generatedanintriguingandnuancedsetof results(Gillet al.,2009).Therewas
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tries should form that community. Among respondents from ASEAN+3 countries,
signiﬁcantmajoritiessupportedtheinclusionof India(80%),theUS(79%),andAustralia
(74%), while New Zealand and the EU failed to garner majority support.Yet despite their
enthusiasm for community-building, the respondents expected unilateral, bilateral, and
global arrangements to play a more important role in addressing a variety of challenges
over the ensuing decade.
The BushAdministration responded to these developments by pushing the idea of the
Free Trade Area of the Asia–Paciﬁc, as well as the Px, a kind of coalition of the willing
among APEC’s more liberal members. However, the Obama Administration has sus-
pended US participation in the Px talks. Were it to be made politically practical, the
APEC-wide Free Trade Area for the Asia–Paciﬁc would dominate the intra-Asia alterna-
tives both diplomatically and economically, avoiding“drawing a line down the middle of
the Paciﬁc” and delivering greater increases in economic welfare.
Through the process of diverting trade from globally efﬁcient producers to less
efﬁcient – though preferentially favored – producers in signatory countries, preferential
agreements can potentially harm both signatories and third parties alike. The prospect of
being adversely affected by discriminatory deals in Asia (especially those involving the
large economies of Northeast Asia) might possibly constitute a“wake-up call”for the US
Congress, forcing the USA to reassess its stance and adopt a more forthcoming posture.
Korea, for example, has reached a tentative FTA deal with the EU.
7. Conclusions
The USA and Asia have an enormous stake in each others’ continuing prosperity. This
outcome is in turn linked to the preservation of the open international economic order.
Yet the sustainability of this regime is by no means assured.While technological advances
will presumably continue to reduce the costs of moving labor, capital, and goods across
borders, the political prerequisites may not survive, victim of both inter-state and
domestic politics.American leadership is impaired, discredited by its role as the epicenter
of the global ﬁnancial crisis, and an absence of constructive leadership may contribute to
an erosion of adherence to systemic norms reminiscent of the system-fraying observed
in the ﬁrst decade of the 20th century as the ﬁrst Golden Age of globalization came to a
close.
US policy toward Asia is largely derivative of global issues and speciﬁc bilateral
concerns.The speciﬁcally regional component in both the trade and ﬁnancial ﬁelds could
increaseordecreaseinimportancedependingontheevolutionof institutionsattheglobal
level.
Addressing current macroeconomic and ﬁnancial sector challenges is the top priority.
Management of the international aspects of these issues appears to be shifting toward the
G-20 which means enhanced inﬂuence for Asian countries, which, with the exception of
Japan, were excluded from the G-7. The April 2009 G-20 meeting appeared to signal a
broad consensus with respect to greater regulation of ﬁnancial markets and institutions,
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governance of those institutions.An overarching challenge is how to achieve an economi-
cally and diplomatically sustainable consensus behind a set of institutions and practices
which allow the unwinding of massive international imbalances, in effect a “grand
bargain” which would reduce the need for self-insurance which politically can be inter-
preted as mercantilism. China is central to resolving this issue.
In the trade arena, three issues require prompt attention: the re-establishment of
fast-track negotiating authority for the President, the resolution of the Doha Round
impasse, and the passage of the KORUS FTA. The highest priority should be placed on
passing KORUS,if only because the cost of failure to do so,in both economic and broader
diplomatic terms, is so large. To make this trade policy agenda politically palatable, it will
probably need to be coupled with a broader set of social safety net and education policies
– desirable in their own right – to alleviate the American public’s anxieties about global
competition.
The Administration will also face a series of ongoing issues where the risks
are longer-term in nature, and the common recommendation is “ﬁrst, do no harm.”
This applies to regulation of ﬁnancial markets in the USA, regulation of foreign invest-
ment in the USA, particularly by SWFs, and the multifaceted economic engagement
with China, in its macroeconomic, ﬁnancial, and trade and investment dimensions,
which will be the most politically sensitive bilateral relationship for the foreseeable
future.
Finally,intheareaof leastimmediatedomesticpoliticalsensitivity,theAdministration
will have to formulate a coherent strategy for responding to the emerging regional and
subregional policy initiatives within Asia in both the ﬁnancial and trade spheres. The
evolution of these initiatives in turn will be affected by developments at the global level.
With respect to ﬁnance, ﬁrst priority should be on ensuring that the expanding regional
initiatives are compatible with the broader global ﬁnancial architecture, and secondly, on
pursuing the speciﬁcs of the US policy agenda through institutions such as the ADB and
the G-20. Analogously, in the trade area the emphasis should be on shaping the develop-
ment of preferential schemes in ways that are compatible with broader global rules, and
responding – by pre-emption,emulation,or countermeasures – preferential schemes that
would harm US interests.
In the absence of adequate reform at the global level, the alternative could be further
fragmentation into competing regional blocs. Asia holds the key, combining both dissat-
isfaction with existing global arrangements with the resources to reconstitute, at least at
the regional level, an alternative set of institutions and practices. How Asia responds,
acting to strengthen reformed global institutions or undermine them in favor of regional
alternatives,willpartlydependonthepoliciesof thedominantglobalpower,theUSA.The
most constructive course for the USA would be to re-emphasize global liberalization
through the WTO and thereby reduce the value of preferential deals. Alternatively, the
USA could play tit-for-tat: either by trying to match or join the Asian initiatives, or by
further expanding its own web of preferential agreements. Either option assumes that the
USA has the political capacity to liberalize trade.
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1 The poll was conducted in six Asian countries: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, and the
Philippines. Dissatisfaction with the international system was the highest in the Philippines
(88%),with majorities supporting major changes in the international system in Australia (76%),
China (75%), and Indonesia (62%). Majorities in the Philippines (92%), Indonesia (73%), and
China (59%) also supported signiﬁcant change in their domestic economic systems. Japan was
the only country in the 24-country global sample in which majorities did not support major or
minor changes in the international system and a majority only supported minor change at the
domestic level.
2 Governance problems are evident with respect to the selection of senior leadership as well. By
tradition, the president of the World Bank is an American, the managing director of the IMF a
European, and the head of the ADB, Japanese, reﬂecting the political legacies of 1944 and, in the
case of the ADB, the power of the purse. And despite some problematic choices, none of the
incumbentsappearwillingtoacquiescetoareformof thisanachronisticsystem,thoughtheApril
2009 G-20 Leaders statement contains encouraging language.
3 See also http://www.pollingreport.com/trade.htm
4 Democratsareconsiderablymoretrade-skepticalthanRepublicans,withsolidmajoritiesholding
negative views. Republicans are essentially evenly split, 43% versus 42% in support of FTAs.
Statistical modeling suggests that Democratic House members systematically are less inclined to
vote for FTAs than their Republican counterparts. However, the sample period 2003–2006 was
one in which the President was a Republican, and there is some evidence that the pattern of
partisanship shifted on close votes, suggesting that Republican leaders may have been calibrating
marginal votes carefully (all FTAs were passed). Whether this pattern of calibrating marginal
votes will continue under a Democrat President and Congress remains to be seen. A recent
attempt to remove the “Buy American” provision of the stimulus bill was defeated in the Senate
65-31 without a single Democrat voting in favor.
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